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Abstract 
 
Reality shows in television featuring business angels, such as Shark Tank and 
Dragon's Den, have gained a lot of popularity in recent years. They bring to the invited 
companies not only the possibility to raise capital for their company next to business 
angels, but also everything that 10 minutes of publicity on national TV can bring. 
Although business angels have been a widely studied topic, this specific subject of TV 
shows featuring them has been so far ignored in research, with no studies regarding the 
effects this kind of show has, either on the featured companies or the economy of the 
country in which it airs. This particular study tries to analyze the effects that a TV show 
like this can have on the featured firms, by analyzing their growth before and after the 
show airing, alongside the growth of similar companies, and making comparisons based 
on the different decisions they take on and after the show. While addressing several 
issues along the way, the main question to answer is if whether or not striking a deal in 
the show is the best outcome for the future growth of the company. The gathered data 
and further analysis curiously shows no statistical evidence to support such claim, while 
also providing some other insights. 
 
 
JEL-codes: D92, O12 
 
Key-words: Business Angels, Dragon's Den, Total Assets, Investment, Firm 
Growth 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
For the past few years, all over the world we have seen reality TV shows in a 
business environment prosper and gain recognition (Edwards, 2006; Lee, 2014). Shows 
such has Shark Tank, Dragon's Den or The Apprentice have been broadcasted and 
franchised in a large number of countries, as we see an entrepreneurship wave rising 
seemingly everywhere. 
Shark Tank or Dragon's Den, title depending on the country where it is aired, 
consists of a TV Show featuring 5 business angels from the country, who listen to 
different pitches from entrepreneurs who have started their own business and are 
looking for capital to grow them. These business angels consist in individuals with vast 
wealth who use it to invest in private companies and help them grow, with hopes of 
future return on their investment (Deakins and Freel, 2003; Gregson et al., 2013; Shane, 
2012). In Portugal, the first season of a Portuguese version of the show, named after the 
American version (Shark Tank), was aired during the period this dissertation was 
carried on. 
The Portuguese version of the show is produced with the main sponsorship of 
Ernst & Young (EY), the same company in which, for the last three months of 2014, I 
did an internship while integrated in the Transaction Advisory Services department, a 
department focused mainly on due diligences of potential M&A deals. When Shark 
Tank was announced, and I found that EY was the main sponsor, I knew I had found the 
subject for my internship report. 
The subject is highly relevant when we take in look the current situation of the 
country itself. The economic outlook of Portugal has suffered in the recent years, as the 
latest crisis was heavily felt and condemned Portugal to an intervention by the Troika 
for financial rescue, the tripartite committee led by the European Commission with the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with the economic growth 
of the country being held back as austerity measures were put in place. Recent 
economic indicators for the recent year and forecasts for the next years by such 
institutions as the IMF itself start to paint a brighter future, and the push for 
entrepreneurship made in the country has undoubtedly played his part. This push made 
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possible the emergence in Portugal of successful companies, such as Farfetch, a start up 
from Guimarães who raised an investment last March of 176 million Euros, which 
represented a valuation of 1 billion Euros for the whole company
1
. 
A show such as Shark Tank can help not only local entrepreneurs seeking 
investment that they couldn't otherwise get, or didn't know how to, but also possibly 
providing some business education in general, and even inspire people on their own 
ventures. 
On the other hand, there have also been some critics against a possible 
undervaluation of the featured companies by the business angels. We will look further 
into this as well in the study. 
It is also important to stress out that no deal made on the show and broadcasted 
is a final deal. All deals are pending due diligence, i.e. after the recording of the show 
the business angel will look into the company information in a more detailed way, 
whether it is financial or operational information, to verify all claims made, and check if 
no vital information was purposely left behind. All parts, entrepreneur and investor, can 
walk out of any deal made on the show, and this is an important note as we will see later 
on. 
The literature on the topic is scarce, namely, on the impact these shows have 
either on the business environment of the country they are broadcasted or on the 
companies who actually feature in them. The literature is even rarer and inexistent on a 
more numerical and pragmatic approach, more precisely, an actual analysis of the 
performance of the companies who feature a show such as the one we are focusing on, 
looking for an investment of an experienced business angel. 
Hence, this is exactly what this study proposes to do, an analysis of the growth 
of actual firms who have featured in those reality shows, before and after the airing of 
their respective episodes.  
The main objective of this work is to answer questions such as: Does featuring a 
show such as Shark Tank or Dragon's Den bring, by itself, benefits for the companies? 
What is the best decision that a company who will actually feature the show could take? 
These will be topics addressed on this study that derive from the key question of this 
                                                        
1"Farfetch recebe investimento de 176 milhões para facturar este ano 450 milhões" 
http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/farfetch-recebe-investimento-de-176-milhoes-para-facturar-este-ano-
450-milhoes_213274.html 
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study: Is striking a deal on the show really the best outcome for the future growth of the 
firm? 
In order to address these issues, comparisons were made among the growth 
performance of a sample of firms who have attended the UK version of the show, 
Dragon's Den UK and the growth of similar firms. 
After this brief introduction, Chapter 2 includes a literature review on the 
different subjects approached throughout the report.  
Chapter 3 presents the methodology and all the different steps to collect the data. 
This will be followed by the presentation and discussion of the results in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 concludes and a Critical Review of the work is presented in Chapter 
6. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
Due to the nature of this internship report and the limited literature on this 
specific topic of entrepreneurial reality TV shows, as well as their economic impact, 
this review will focus on addressing a few key points that are part of the subject and its 
environment by pointing out some definitions, theories and findings relating to the 
topic. 
Hence, this chapter will address first the literature on Angel Investors and the 
Equity Market, then on business reality TV shows and, at last, on the use of total assets 
growth rate as a proxy for the firm growth, as this will be the measure used in the 
analysis made on this study. 
 
 
 
2.1 Business angels and the equity market 
 
 
The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) for their 
respective country's economic prosperity has been well accepted (De Clercq and 
Sapienza, 2006), as they have been often referred to as the "lungs of the economy" and 
account for roughly 90% of businesses and over 50% of employment worldwide (IFC, 
2012). These high-growth businesses have been found to be one of the main reasons 
behind the economic development of countries (Harding and Cowling, 2006), with their 
relevance being therefore easily stated. 
However, often these businesses do not have an easy task when it comes to 
accessing the funds that they need in order to launch, maintain or expand their business 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996). This aspect makes it even harder for such companies to be 
successful in this increasingly competitive world, enhancing their struggles, cash flow 
problems or just plain and simply making it impossible for such companies to continue 
their normal operations. 
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To get the funds they need, after exhausting their own funds and the 3F's 
(Family, Friends and Fools), these firms essentially have two options: a loan and  sell 
equity. More recently, crowd funding emerged as a third option for raising capital, but 
will not be analyzed for the purposes of this work. The first two options are studied by 
(De Bettignies and Brander, 2007), who compare the value of keeping the equity by 
getting the fund through a loan with the value added by a venture capital firm. 
However, a loan is often very expensive, difficult, or even impossible for small 
companies to obtain, and pursuing equity markets becomes the most realistic option for 
an entrepreneur. 
Fenn et al. (1997) explore the private equity sector and define the organized 
private equity market, which essentially comprises professionally managed venture and 
non-venture capital firms. Prowse (1998) later expands on the subject, defining the 
informal private equity market, where "private securities are sold to institutional 
investors and what securities law defines as accredited individuals", and the angel 
market, where individuals invest in securities mainly "not subject to the rigorous 
disclosure requirements for public entities". 
The angel market is then populated by, as the name suggests, angel investors or 
business angels, wealthy individuals who use their own capital and often time and 
experience to invest in small private companies to which they have no family 
connection (Deakins and Freel, 2003; Gregson et al., 2013; Shane, 2012). They are 
probably the biggest source for start-up companies in need of financing, as several 
authors have pointed out. Freear et al. (1996) estimated it to be between 10 and 20 
billion dollars, comparing with 6 billion of the Venture Capital (VC) sector, while 
Wiltbank (2009) argues that business angels (BA) invest annually 2 to 5 times more 
than VC firms and Wong (2009) estimates the BA market to be twice the size of the 
latter.  
Both BA's and VC firms are therefore of the most importance for the future of 
start-up firms. George et al. (2005) highlight that VC firms and BA represent one of the 
most critical owners in entrepreneurial companies, ranking behind only the 
entrepreneurs themselves, while Mason and Harrison (1996) suggest that both types of 
investors have their own value adding capabilities and at the same time provide "smart 
money". 
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However, there are notable differences between the two, with positive and 
negative factors for both sides, and the entrepreneur's choice should be one well 
informed and based on these facts, and what he feels is best for his business.  
Fairchild (2011) compares both groups of VC firms and BA and focuses on the 
empathy relationship between the BA and the entrepreneur. In Fairchild's model, the 
entrepreneur must choose between the empathy he has with the BA and the trust that it 
brings, or the higher value creating abilities of the VC firm, with whom a more distant 
relationship is expected. The empathy of the relationship with the BA creates what he 
calls a "warm glow feeling", a feeling of comfort that can make him choose the BA over 
the VC firm despite the fact that the latter would have actually maximized the company 
value. 
On the other hand, Gregson et al. (2013) note that VC firms tend to focus on 
more mature companies, involving less risk and going with larger deal sizes, leveraging 
their own growth. This has, according to them, created an equity gap, which they define 
citing Reid (1998) as "the absence of small amounts of risk capital from institutional 
sources for companies at the seed, start up and early growth stages".  
BA's can therefore play an important role in closing this equity gap as Mason 
and Harrison (1996) defend, by going after this higher risk/higher rewards ventures, for 
they are often considered the only group of investors open to mainly investing in high-
growth companies dealing with funding problems (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 
2000).  
It also helps that BA often put their trust ahead of documentation such has 
extensive business plans, despite requiring them for investment (Prowse, 1998), and 
rely more on their gut feeling than in traditional financial models used by VC's to 
calculate measures such as a required rate of return on capital. The author also 
highlights that they often complain about the inefficiency of information channels that 
they rely on to find deals, and the number of deals made would probably increase if 
information was more easily accessible, an important point since shows like Shark Tank 
and Dragon’s Den present an opportunity for unknown firms to introduce themselves 
not only to the investors on the show, but also to investors possibly watching at home. 
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When an angel investor has completed an investment in an early stage venture, 
he can essentially deal with it from two different approaches, depending on his 
personality, interest and his style, being a more hands on approach or a more hands off.  
These different approaches are well described once again by Prowse (1998), 
who identifies them as "active angels", and "passive angels". Active angels, besides 
investing in the company, are the ones who actually get involved with the company, 
oversee their evolution, advising and helping in the different ways they can. Passive 
angels on the other hand pretty much just stick with the financing, providing the money 
agreed and not becoming involved with the firm.  
More related to the geography of the sample later used in this paper, Lindstrom 
and Olofsson (2001) actually suggest that BA in the UK tend to be more passive than 
usual, participating little in meetings and being reluctant in engaging with the firm. 
However we will be analyzing TV angel investors, more connected to the public 
audience and one could argue that they are more open due to that, and would tend to 
have a more active approach. Also, according to Fiet (1995), the possibility of agency 
risks, the entrepreneur pursuing his own personal interests, can often lead to more actual 
post investment involvement by the investor, and Mason and Harrison (1996) suggest 
that even more passive BA's tend to get more involved with the firm they invested in 
when harder times arise and create difficulties to the firm.  
This activeness of BA's, the relationship they have, their involvement, is actually 
the most important way in which they add value to their investee firm (Politis, 2008). 
When they get into an investment, these active angel investors don't just provide 
financial input (Harding and Cowling, 2006), but actually go beyond that.  
This is of extreme importance, since despite the entrepreneurs in charge of 
young high growth firms generally being technically well trained, most of the times 
they lack the management skills and business training and experience required to 
succeed in this increasingly competitive business environment (Freel, 1999), and the 
firms themselves in general are not in possession of relevant social capital, meaning 
business contacts or access to networks that they need (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
Therefore, we can begin to grasp the value added by such investors. Numerous 
studies have been done trying to capture all the different ways in which they add value. 
Apart from the obvious fact that an investment from an angel investor will help in the 
 
 
15 
 
financial aspect, overcoming the funding problems of the firm, active angels also 
provide the investee firm with their own management expertise, their experience and 
knowledge in the business world, they provide them with access to their own network 
of contacts, opening up new opportunities for the firm, they can give the firm some 
technological stimulation by arming it with new tools, while also making the firm more 
credible in a financial point of view, leveraging it for further funding from other sources 
such as banks or venture capital firms, as the risk of the firm is reduced by their 
investment  (Harding and Cowling, 2006; Macht and Robinson, 2010; Mason, 2006). 
Prowse (1998) also points out that angel investors can also help the investee 
firm by hiring top management personnel with deep knowledge on the industry, recruit 
valuable members for the board, or help on more specific aspects of the business such 
as solving major operational problems, evaluating capital expenditures or helping with 
the definition of the firm's long term strategy. 
Even the entrepreneurs themselves often recognize that the experience of the 
business angels, their knowledge and expertise are more valuable to them than the 
actual financial input (Lindstrom and Olofsson, 2001). 
Hence, due to the high mortality rate of start-up firms, with more than 50% of 
start-ups in Europe closing their businesses within 5 years of their birth (European 
Commission, 2003),  the angels become a critical factor in the hopes of dodging this 
end, a help that any young firm would be grateful in having. 
In the light of this information, it is good news that the number of business 
angels, as well as  the number of actual deals that they agree on, are on the rise 
(Brzozowska, 2008). This is probably due also to an increase in the interest on 
Entrepreneurship, as more and more people dream with their own business, as we can 
observe in the USA with the general population's past dream of owning their own a 
house shifting nowadays towards owning a their own business, a trend seen in Europe 
too. This creates more opportunities for the angels to invest as more companies are 
"investable". 
In a timeframe perspective, most angels have an investment horizon of five 
years (Prowse, 1998), meaning they hope to get a return on their investment within that 
time, since studies have shown that the most value added by investors actually happens 
within the first few years of the investment, when the impact of their presence and 
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added benefits is really felt (Bertoni et al., 2011). Therefore, in a way, it is within that 
timeframe that they will have the best return on their investment. 
 
2.2 Business related reality TV shows 
 
 
The business world has been present in television for many years, but up until 
very close to the turn of the millennium, it was seen in very different eyes than it is seen 
today. 
Up until then, no real TV shows were made with the purpose of deeply 
exploring or focusing on the business aspects and particularities of any person, situation 
or subject. Business television was far away from popular culture, and was reserved for 
targeted programs to business people. Usually in popular culture, business men in 
fictional TV shows tended to be represented has bad, sneaky and fraudulent, always 
leaving a bad impression and misrepresenting the people involved in such an important 
area of our life. This was due to a vision from the executives that 'money was boring' 
for television, that predominated for many years (Edwards, 2006). 
In the UK, this changed in the 1990's with the appearance of shows in the 
business entertainment format such as the Troubleshooter, and has continued since in 
the new millennium with shows as Dragon's Den and The Apprentice. With these 
changes in the TV environment, airing shows that reflected the values of 
entrepreneurship, the TV industry even learned some of its values for itself and started 
its own mini-revolution, leading to changes in its culture and also starting the rise of 
independent TV stations, while inciting the same entrepreneurship values to their 
audience (Lee, 2014). 
These changes were also reflected in the popular view of what is an employee. 
The public conscious was saturated with the image of a "loyal company man", the only 
image that was projected and promoted towards them (Sampson, 1995). This also 
changed as the image of the risk taking entrepreneur started to be projected too, after 
being away for so long, along with their failures and successes. 
While showing this, their journeys, their ups and downs, their good and bad 
sides, shows such as the Dragon's Den, as suggested by Down (2010), act as a guide for 
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the viewer, providing them with a list of do's and don'ts in order to succeed, what are  
the behaviors that a successful entrepreneur should have. 
Nolan (2012) argues that a show like Dragon's Den "relies upon and extends its 
audiences' literacy in the language of business", providing them with not only quality 
entertainment, but also giving them the chance to learn and get a few key points on how 
to achieve success in business. A similar point is made by Kiersey (2014), who argues 
that this kind of shows give the viewers a feeling that by taking their message seriously 
and following their advices, a business can succeed even during a bad recession. 
The show has been featured in many countries from all over the world, with all 
types of backgrounds, while its format has also been widely spread and useful, 
particularly in developing countries (Jubraj, 2015). The United Bank of Africa even 
introduced a similar TV show in 2008, stating that "Dragon's Den is unique and 
different from other business reality shows and will further the bank's aim to promote 
entrepreneurship and innovation in Africa." 
 
 
 
2.3 Total assets growth rate as proxy for growth 
 
 
Since the purpose of this paper is to evaluate the growth of the companies that 
were participants in the UK version of Dragon's Den, whether or not they successfully 
completed a deal, it becomes quite important to discuss how will this be made, what 
kind of data and framework will be used, because available data regarding 
entrepreneurial firms is rather slim and rare (Brav, 2009). 
Garnsey et al. (2003) analyzed growth measures for young companies, and 
classified them into three different types:  measuring in terms of inputs (such as 
investment or number of employees), in terms of value (such as own assets or market 
capitalization) or in terms of outputs (such as sales or profits). A review of the studies 
made on growth was also done by Delmar (1997), who concluded that overall the 
measures of growth most often used are growth of sales, employees, assets and market 
share. 
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Due to the scarcity of reliable information on data, for the purposes of this work 
we will focus on the measures in terms of value as per Garnsey et al. (2003), most 
specifically the value of assets. This is because the data available for this analysis lead 
to the conclusion that data regarding inputs or outputs is even more scarce and rare, 
while information on assets is more easily available in databases such as Amadeus, at 
least regarding firms based in the UK, which is the scope of this work. 
As in other studies such as Alarape (2007), Glancey (1998), the total assets 
growth rate of firms will be used as proxy for their actual growth rate. 
Revest and Sapio (2013) actually make a comparison between private 
companies and listed companies utilizing, among other data, the total assets growth rate, 
with the purpose of studying the relevance of what they call the Alternative Investment 
Market towards the growth of a firm. 
Hence, the total assets growth rate will be calculated in accordance to 
Weinzimmer et al.(1998): 
 
𝑔 =  
(𝑇𝐴1 − 𝑇𝐴0)
𝑇𝐴0
 
 
where g represents the total assets growth rate for the period between 0 and 1; 
TA1 is the total assets value at time 1; TA0 is the total assets value at time 0. 
We shall also keep in mind that the relative growth of a company has a negative 
relationship with not only that said company's age, but also with its size (Evans, 1987). 
 
 
 
2.4 Similar studies 
 
 
Despite not yet having been made studies that analyze the performance of 
companies who have participated in TV shows such as Dragon's Den before and after 
the show, there have naturally been studies who have analyzed the growth of companies 
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in different situations and circumstances throughout a period of time, which in all 
fairness is the exact goal of this study. 
Different methods have been used, and a compilation of a few studies taking a 
similar approach for an analysis on other unrelated subjects can be found in the 
Annexes. 
Most of them use the total assets growth rate as a unit of analysis for firm 
growth, even if not as the only unit of analysis in their study, but just one of several. 
The methods for analysis used vary from Correlation and Regression to try to establish 
deltas between the featured groups of each study. 
The method applied in the present study, however, will not be one of those, as 
available information for this topic is not enough to make a proper regression or 
correlation analysis with a specific purpose. 
Solomon (1997) on the other hand uses stock prices as unit of analysis, which 
essentially represent a market evaluation of the company's assets. He evaluates the 
value added by consultants to their client firms, using an approach of setting a 
timeframe of a certain time before and after the consulting engagement. This is also 
important since for the purposes of this work there is the need to set a timeframe around 
the airing of the show itself, to analyze the growth between it. 
Hence, despite these studies being on different and unrelated subjects, bits and 
pieces of their approach can be adapted into this work. 
 
 
 
2.5 Critical review of literature 
 
 
When we take a look on what's available as literature on Business Angels, it is 
obvious that a lot of research has been done on this topic, on their characteristics and 
features, on the type of benefits that they bring to their investee firms, among other 
things. 
However, it seems that a more analytical approach to the benefits is still lacking. 
This topic has essentially been covered mostly on a theoretical basis, which despite 
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being understandable due to the difficulty of gathering information, leaves the door 
wide open for other authors to step in and contribute with models and analytic analysis 
on the subject. 
Even a subject somewhat easily quantifiable, such as an analytical approach to 
the difference of performance between VC backed firms and Angel Investors firms, is a 
subject that only as seen the work of Fairchild (2011), and can still be further 
developed. 
This is even more the case when talking about business related television. All 
literature found is a theoretical approach on the subject, the evolution of the business 
thematic in television overtime, how it has changed and how it has produced changes. 
This however is not really backed up with numbers, neither other potential studies have 
been made addressing any of the numerous questions one could ask in an analytical 
point of view towards the benefits (or not) of these shows. 
Hence, this is what this work aims to do, an analytical study in this fields which 
are, so far, much more based on theory. The goal is to provide with a first analytical 
analysis on the participants of a show such as this one, gathering data from their 
performance throughout the years and assessing with numbers the different growths of 
the firms depending on the outcome of their participation of the show.  
21 
 
3. Methodology and data 
 
 
In order to answer the main question of this study (Is striking a deal on the show 
really the best outcome for the future growth of the firm?), the UK’s Dragon’s Den was 
chosen as the analyzed program, since not only is the show now on the 12
th
 season, and 
so has a fairly big enough pool of data to study, but also the geography of the featured 
firms in the show provides us with the ability to access the Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk 
database to retrieve their financial information, something not possible with US or 
Canada companies, the two other biggest versions of the show.   
 
 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
 
In order to collect the data, season 6 until Season 10, aired between 2008 and 
2012, were watched. Season 6 was chosen has the point of beginning since it was 
essentially the borderline, as information on companies from past seasons was less 
likely to find in Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk. Season 10 was chosen as the end because it 
was the last one that allowed for an analysis of what has happened at least 2 years since 
the show itself aired. 
From a total of 184 companies featuring the episodes, there were 96 companies 
who received an offer from at least one of the Dragons, with 83 of them being accepted 
and 13 rejected. There were also 88 companies who had not received any sort of offer. 
A thorough search was then conducted in the Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk and 
Duedil databases, accessing those companies balance sheets in order to gather the 
information related with the total assets of the companies. 
For comparison purposes, a peer group was selected for each one of the 
companies, comprising the 10 firms in the same industry (according to the NACE code) 
and in the same country – with the closest total assets value to each sample company in 
a given year. After retrieving the same relevant financial data as the one previously 
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retrieved for the analyzed companies, the median for each group of 10 was calculated. 
The use of the median instead of an average was chosen to lower the possible influence 
of the existence of outliers in the sample. 
At this point, the sample was reduced from 96 companies who had received an 
offer to 80 who also had relevant financial information available. The companies with 
no offers were also reduced from 88 to 44 with the same sort of information. 
The next step was to define a timeframe to analyze the companies. Taking for 
example the work of Solomon (1997), the decision was to focus on the performance of a 
short time before the show aired, and a longer period after the show aired, to compare 
the evolution of the growth measures in the different situations. Therefore, knowing the 
date in which each episode had aired, the period defined starts in the year before an 
episode was aired, and ends two years following it. 
This timeframe essentially comprises 3 growth rates, one for each full year of 
the analysis, which means that the financial data on 4 consecutive years of the company 
was gathered. The periods will be represented as: 
 
• year -1 (the year just before the airing of the show) 
• year 1 (the first year after the airing of the show) 
• year 2 (the second year after the airing of the show) 
 
This further reduced the sample, since not all of the companies with financial 
information available actually met all these requirements. Of the 80 companies who had 
received an offer and had financial data available, only 35 of them had it for the 
required 4 years.  
However, 13 more companies had the data for the first three consecutive years 
and so could be used in partially in our analysis. This means that the third year growth 
rate, which is related to the second year after the airing of the show, will have a slightly 
smaller sample. 
Hence, we got a final sample of 48 companies who had received an offer and 
met the necessary requirements to be part of the analysis. Moreover, regarding the set of 
companies receiving no offers in the show, the final sample was further reduced to 16 
 
 
23 
 
firms meeting the requirements. Table 2 provides a breakdown of these the trimming 
down of the sample: 
 
Table 1 - Overview of the companies' data 
Total of companies   184 
  Without offers 88 
  
 
With all required 
information 
16 
  With offers   96 
           Accepted   83 
  
 
With all required 
information 
41 
           Rejected   13 
    
With all required 
information 
7 
 
Besides these 3 years of the chosen timeframe, the data (for the companies who 
had it available) from the year before and after the timeframe, i.e. year -2 and year 3 as 
they will be referred to from now on, was also retrieved and will be presented, with an 
even smaller sample. This will not be part of the main analysis, the comparisons among 
the different groups, but will instead just be used for some general considerations on the 
sample as a whole. 
Finally, for all those final sample companies, the total assets growth rate was 
calculated in accordance to Weinzimmer et al. (1998) as previously mentioned.  
The same calculation was done to the total assets medians of each of the 
companies' peer groups. These growth rates were calculated to represent the growth rate 
performance of similar firms in the same industry. 
It was also important to find out whether or not the accepted deals on the show 
had actually gone through or not. As stated before, the deals broadcasted on the show 
are not final or binding, as due diligences must be conducted afterwards, and further 
negotiations may occur.  
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After a search for news on these deals was conducted turned out only a few 
results and clarifications, this was complemented by the work of Tigermobiles
1
, who 
conducted a research on the developments of companies who featured Dragon's Den 
UK. To answer this particular question, they accessed a paid website managed by the 
UK Government that provides information on British firms, Companies House
2
, and 
searched the Directors, Shareholders and Board Members history of the companies to 
access if any of the Dragons was ever featured in them. 
This allowed us to better understand what actually happened after the show for 
the majority of companies, leaving just one company with no information, who was 
therefore left outside of the sample. Of the final 48 companies left in the sample 
receiving an offer from the Dragons, of which 41 had accepted it, only 12 of these deals 
actually went through, with 29 falling in the due diligence stages. 
This is actually in line with reported news articles regarding the outcome of such 
deals in the UK version of Dragon's Den. According to a report by Burn-Callander
3
, 
over half of the deals made on the show in that country don't actually make it through 
the due diligence stage, and fall through. 
 
 
 
3.2 Comparable groups 
 
 
In Figure 1, we can have a better understanding at the breakdown between 
groups that the featured firms endured, as well as the number of firms in each group 
present in the sample, assigning a number to each one of these groups for better 
identification. 
                                                        
1 Dragons' Den - Where Are They Now? https://www.tigermobiles.com/dragons-den/ 
2 Companies House https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house 
3"Half of Dragons' Den investments fall through after the show" 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/businessclub/money/11425328/Half-of-Dragons-Den-investments-
fall-through-after-the-show.html 
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Figure 1 - Breakdown of groups by stage and their sample size 
 
Since the purpose of the study is to analyze the firms’ growth through the 
different options that they have when faced with a presence in a show such as Dragon's 
Den, from the first choice of actually featuring the show or not, to the subsequent 
choices when possibly being faced with an offer, these groups should clearly be based 
on the already identified and mentioned key stages of the procedure. 
The methodology of the study was rather simple: first the difference between 
each company's growth performance and the growth of the median performance of their 
peers was calculated. This provides us with the peer adjusted variation for each 
company in each year, i.e. the difference between their performance in a given year and 
the median of the similar firms in the industry; 
 
𝑝𝑋𝑇𝐴1
=  𝑔𝑋𝑇𝐴1
−  𝑔𝐺𝑋𝑇𝐴1
 
 
where 𝑝𝑋𝑇𝐴1 represents the peer adjusted variation of the total assets value of 
company X during period 1, 𝑔𝑋𝑇𝐴1  represents the growth rate of the total assets of 
company X during period 1, and finally 𝑔𝐺𝑋𝑇𝐴1  represents the growth rate of the 
median of total assets for the peer group of company X during period 1. 
1 - All firms 
(n = 64)
2 - Received 
Offer (48)
4 - Accepted 
Offer (41)
6 - Deal went 
through (12)
7 - Deal fell 
through (29)
5 - Rejected 
Offer (7)
3 - No Offer 
(16)
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Next, these differentials would be bundled in the groups previously defined, 
compiling the average for each group of firms, as well as each groups' peers. Hence, 
each group has his own peer adjusted variation, and this can be used for further 
comparisons between the groups' differentials themselves. 
The decision on which comparisons should be made was based on the key splits 
of the firms by groups, and comprising all possible sets of data. This means that first we 
compare groups 4 and 5, as Figure 2 shows: 
 
vs. 
 
 
Figure 2 - First comparison 
 
Secondly, we compare group number 6 to all the proposals that didn't end up in 
a final deal, that is with groups number 5 and 7 combined. If choosing to compare only 
with deals that fell through, group number 7, we would be biasing the analysis and 
missing on relevant and available data. Figure 3 better explains the chosen comparison: 
 
 
vs. 
 
Figure 3 - Second comparison 
 
Besides this, we will also take a look at the global picture of all firms, as well as 
to the firms who didn't receive an offer. 
The method for the analysis chosen was the simple statistical comparison of 
averages and medians, because the lack of further information for the reasons on why 
some of the deals failed or the outcome of other investment opportunities made it 
impossible to proceed with a regression type of analysis. 
4 - Companies 
who accepted 
offers on the 
show 
5 - Companies 
who rejected 
offers 
on the show 
6 - Companies 
whose deals 
actually went 
through 
5+7 - All 
companies who 
had offer but no 
deal in the end 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
 
In this section, the results will be presented in a sequential way following the 
logic of the study, going from a broader analysis towards other ones more narrow and 
specific. A deep discussion of the results will also be featured in this section, along each 
step of the presentation of the results gathered.  
For this, several tables representing the gathered data will be shown along this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
4.1 Overview of all data 
 
 
In a first overview, we take a look at the full picture and see how the all the 
analyzed companies and their peer groups have performed during the chosen timeframe 
for this study. This can be seen in Table 2: 
 
Table 2 - Growth of all firms 
All Firms n = 31 n = 64 n = 64 n = 51 n = 30 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 108.36% 160.23% 42.90% 39.97% 6.73% 
Peer Groups 4.80% 11.33% 15.07% 16.23% 8.88% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 103.56% 148.90% 27.83% 23.74% -2.15% 
 
 
In this overview of the whole pool of data, we can first recognize that the 
companies featuring Dragon's Den have a very large growth surplus regarding their 
peer groups in the years prior to featuring the show. This is easily explained by the pre-
selection stages that an application to feature the show takes. 
This pre-selection process, comprised of several stages that all firms must 
endure, naturally leads to, in the majority of the cases, only companies with high growth 
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being invited to continue progressing on these stages and finally get an actual chance to 
pitch to the investors. This was a natural expectation, as the investors only want to risk 
their money in firms who have shown potential, i.e. have a high growth on the recent 
past to back up the projections that they claim for a bright future. 
A surplus of the growth of the companies compared to their peers is again 
registered in the two years after the airing of the show, although being smaller. In the 
third year after the airing of the show, the peers actually grow slightly more than the 
featured companies, albeit almost insignificant. 
Again, it was also expected that the firms would perform better than their peers 
in the first years after the show in a general sense, even if only due to the "television 
effect", and that seems to be in line with the observations. In 2013, G. Deeb, in an 
article for Forbes
1
, uses the cost of a 30 second commercial on the show in the US of 
72,000$ to evaluate the 10 minutes of pitch that a company gets on it worth of 
1,440,000$. The benefits that such exposure brings to a firm could then easily take it to 
the next level on its own. 
This result suggests that, as expected, just featuring the show brings benefits to 
the companies, but we will see in the next point that it may not be the case. 
An accumulated compilation of the companies’ growth can be seen in Table 3, 
again for the whole sample analyzed. 
 
Table 3 - Accumulated growth of all firms 
All Firms n = 64 n = 51 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 239.95% 413.69% 
Peer Groups 25.96% 41.49% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 213.99% 372.20% 
 
 
This table confirms that firms grow much more than their peers in each industry 
during the timeframe of the analysis, building up on their momentum from featuring the 
show. 
                                                        
1"Comparing “Shark Tank” To Venture Capital Reality" 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgedeeb/2013/10/09/comparing-shark-tank-to-venture-capital-reality/ 
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4.2 Firms without offers 
 
 
Now, looking at the companies who didn't receive any offer, this will provide us 
with a different picture than what we have previously seen. Table 4 shows the results: 
 
Table 4 - Growth of firms without offers 
No offers n = 10 n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 n = 9 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 107.25% 60.68% 31.87% -0.18% 12.18% 
Peer Groups 8.52% -4.68% 27.79% 9.17% 3.36% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 98.73% 65.36% 4.08% -9.36% 8.83% 
 
 
As we can see, the performance of these companies versus their peer groups is 
much poorer than the one observed in the overall sample. The companies were still 
outperforming their peers largely before featuring the show, as was expected since they 
were chosen, at least most of them, because they were high growth companies, but after 
the actual airing, their performance growth is just ordinary. 
Just a slight surplus in year 1, offset by a deficit 2 times larger in year 2, lets one 
start to question if featuring the show, without receiving an offer, actually brings any 
benefits to the firm by itself. 
Naturally the investors, experienced and with a high level of knowledge, will 
end up selecting the "best companies", and the ones with better chances to succeed. 
However, this raises doubts on whether or not the companies can benefit from the 
"television effect" alone. 
In an article for the Wall Street Journal discussing the US version of Shark 
Tank, Greathouse (2014) at one point mentions the possibility of bad advertising for the 
firms that go there. He argues that if a product is poorly received by the investors, it 
could enhance the difficulties in the future to raise funding. 
In general, what we can see from this overview is that, aside from a possible 
(rather small) initial hype after the first airing of the show, the firms who get no offers 
don't really get much from the presence in terms of their growth. 
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On the other hand, it doesn't appear to hurt them either as suggested by 
Greathouse (2014). 
Looking at the accumulated data, shown in Table 5, we get essentially the same 
insights, a performance until year 1 that is much more based on the growth before 
actually appearing on the show (65.36% surplus in the previous table for year -1) and 
one until year 2 that declines from the accumulated growth of the previous year: 
 
Table 5 - Accumulated growth of firms without offers 
No Offers n = 16 n = 16 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 115.09% 113.59% 
Peer Groups 11.05% 29.09% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 104.05% 84.50% 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Firms who accepted offers vs. Firms who rejected offers 
 
 
Concentrating only in the companies who actually got an offer within the show 
we are able to make a more detailed analysis. 
The comparison will be done in two steps: companies who accepted offers on 
the show versus the companies who rejected offers in the same stage and companies 
whose deal actually went through after the due diligence stage versus all the companies 
who either rejected the offer on the show, or whose deal fell apart for any reason. 
The results of the first comparison can be observed in Tables 6 and 7, with 6 
representing the rejected offers and 7 the accepted ones: 
 
Table 6 - Growth of firms who rejected offers 
Rejected n = 5 n = 7 n = 7 n = 5 n = 3 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 169.82% 305.92% 38.33% 193.03% 0.59% 
Peer Groups 14.12% 13.98% 12.29% 25.40% 18.96% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 155.70% 291.94% 26.04% 167.64% -18.37% 
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Table 7 - Growth of firms who accepted offers 
Accepted n = 16 n = 41 n = 41 n = 30 n = 18 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 89.84% 174.21% 47.98% 35.87% 5.33% 
Peer Groups 6.22% 13.95% 13.00% 10.96% 8.64% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 83.63% 160.26% 34.98% 24.91% -3.31% 
 
 
The first conclusion we can take from these results, is that the companies who 
rejected the offers have a much higher growth versus their peers during the pre-show 
years than the companies who accepted the offers on the show, being almost the double 
in percentage terms. 
We can only speculate whether the rejection was due to greedy entrepreneurs, 
who felt they would deserve a better deal than the deal offered, or due to greedy 
investors that were trying to undervalue the deals, leaving no choice to the 
entrepreneurs but to reject them. 
Deeb (2013) touched precisely this point in his previously mentioned article for 
Forbes, making a comparison of the deals made on Shark Tank to the deals made by 
VC's firms, concluding that the valuation standards on the TV show were much lower 
than in traditional VC's, and that the dilution levels much higher. This is an observation 
also supported by Greathouse (2014), who argues the investors in the show usually 
under-value the companies. Some data regarding this argument will also be presented in 
the last point of this section. 
Since these companies rejecting the offers show larger growth differentials, they 
are possibly more strong on their valuation ambitions and tend to resist more to the 
under valuations of the investors, showing more confidence and persistence on their 
beliefs. 
However, after the airing of the show, the companies who have accepted the 
offers invert the tendency and have peer adjusted variation almost 10% larger than the 
companies who rejected. 
Bertoni et al. (2011) claim that most benefits collected from investments are 
created in the first years after the injection of capital, and this evidence seems to support 
that claim. However we should remember that in this particular analysis, these accepted 
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deals include the ones that actually failed to progress past due diligence and so a deep 
analysis will be needed to assess those claims. 
Another explanation could lie within the good publicity of actually striking a 
deal in the show. Good comments and support by the investors in the show, positive 
attitude and the psychological aspect of a success could possibly induce strongly in the 
audience the notion that the company provides a good service/product. 
On the third year after the show we see the abnormal growth for both groups of 
companies end, supporting these last couple of claims. 
Looking at the accumulate growth in Tables 8 and 9 the group that accepted the 
offer presents a higher peer adjusted growth rate than the group of companies that 
rejected the offer: 
 
Table 8 - Accumulated growth of firms who rejected offers 
Rejected n = 7 n = 5 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 111.08% 467.83% 
Peer Groups 18.13% 60.23% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 92.95% 407.60% 
 
 
 
Table 9 - Accumulated growth of firms who accepted offers 
Accepted n = 41 n = 30 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 307.64% 554.72% 
Peer Groups 32.75% 44.56% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 274.88% 510.16% 
 
 
This results suggest once again that accepting an offer in the show can bring 
good publicity for the firm and enhance the growth, as the stamp of success in the eyes 
of customers can be powerful. 
Finally, it is important to notice the small number of firms which rejected the 
offer, making these results difficult to extrapolate. 
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4.4 Firms with final deals vs. Firms with rejected/failed deals 
 
 
Moving to the last comparative analysis, we look at the stage after due diligence 
has been performed and the deal outcome is final and definite, featuring the deals that 
actually took place versus the deals that were rejected or fell through at some point of 
the process. Tables 10 and 11 show the results for all the deals rejected or failed and for 
deals that went through, respectively: 
 
Table 10 - Growth of firms with rejected/failed deals 
Rejected/Failed deals n = 18 n = 36 n = 36 n = 27 n = 14 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 101.80% 215.60% 52.00% 57.27% 8.40% 
Peer Groups 6.76% 17.98% 11.74% 7.62% 5.36% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 95.04% 197.62% 40.26% 49.65% 3.04% 
 
 
 
Table 11 - Growth of firms with concluded deals 
Deal went through n = 3 n = 12 n = 12 n = 8 n = 7 
  Year -2 Year -1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Featured Firms 151.36% 126.88% 30.29% 61.91% -2.83% 
Peer Groups 16.12% 1.87% 16.35% 31.28% 19.62% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 135.24% 125.01% 13.94% 30.63% -22.46% 
 
 
The first results show us that the peer adjusted variation is highly positive in 
both cases before the companies featured in the show. 
However, when we analyze the years after the airing of the show, we find that 
both in year 1 and 2, the companies that didn’t get any deal done have a peer adjusted 
variation that is the triple of the companies who actually concluded the deal with the 
Dragons in year 1 and nearly the double in year 2. 
This is contrary to what was expected, which was that the firms who got the 
Dragons' financial and entrepreneurial help would outperform the firms who decided to 
do without it.  
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To what reason(s) can we deem this discovery? One possible explanation can be 
found in Landström (1993) that states UK angels tend to be more passive than active, 
not getting much involved and providing the investment and reading reports. Could this 
be the case, that these particular TV investors actually end up being too passive and 
don't contribute much to their firms growth, leading to this observations, and would we 
see different results if the geography of the study was different? 
The accumulated tables highlight even more these differences, as we can see in 
Tables 12 and 13: 
 
Table 12 - Accumulated growth of firms with rejected/failed deals 
Rejected/Failed deals n = 36 n = 27 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 323.10% 655.94% 
Peer Groups 34.25% 48.17% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 288.85% 607.77% 
 
 
 
Table 13 - Accumulated growth of firms with concluded deals 
Deal that went through n = 12 n = 8 
  Acc. To Year 1 Acc. To Year 2 
Featured Firms 146.57% 158.81% 
Peer Groups 19.74% 42.18% 
Peer Adjusted Variation 126.84% 116.63% 
 
 
Here, the difference is even larger, raising more doubts on the actual benefits of 
an offer on the show.  
Another important factor that may explain the difference is the fact that not 
getting any deal with the Dragons, whether the firms rejected their initial offer or their 
deal fell through for some reason along the due diligence stage, does not mean that they 
didn't receive an investment from elsewhere. Since they were actually looking for 
funding, it's possible that in most of the cases they actually ended up getting funds from 
another investor, being a business angel or not. 
There is not much information on this, but from research on the companies, we 
can say that of the 29 companies whose accepted deal fell through in the due diligence 
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stage, 6 was because the entrepreneur refused the offer and found funding elsewhere. 
For the remaining 23, for most of them the reasons are unknown. 
We can only speculate that these companies actually found more committed 
investors, more active angels, or even decided to go to a VC firm, realizing they could 
get a better deal there. 
It is also curious to realize that on the third year after the show, the peer adjusted 
variation on both groups plummets, with the companies with definite deals with the 
angels actually growing 22% less than their peers. Again, we find evidence to support 
the claim made by Bertoni et al. (2011) that most value added by investors is shown in 
the first years after the investment. 
 
 
 
4.5 Other results 
 
 
Looking deeply at the possibility defended by both Deeb (2013) and Greathouse 
(2014), that investors on the show constantly undervalue the companies and which may 
explain the higher growth of firms who reject the deals, data on the proposals by the 
investors was analyzed. Table 14 provides the averages of the proposals by the 
entrepreneurs which received an offer, as well as the final offers from the investors, 
whether they were accepted or not: 
 
Table 14 - Averages of all proposals and offers 
(GBP) 
First proposals by 
Entrepreneurs 
Final Offers from 
Dragons 
Investment  92,900 101,900 
Equity percentage 14.9% 36.6% 
Firm Valuation 771,300 298,900 
 
 
The fact that the average investment offered is higher that the proposals can be 
misleading, since one of the rules of the show is that the Entrepreneurs must get a full 
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offer on their asked amount, i.e., the investment offer of the investors can't be lower 
than what was proposed. 
However, when we look at the equity percentage, we see that the final offers 
average is of more of the double than what the entrepreneurs first were aiming to dilute. 
The firm valuation average from the offers brings the value of the firms down to less 
than half of what the entrepreneurs were hoping for. This data shows an even more 
disparity than the one that Deeb (2013) mentions in her article, based on the American 
version, suggesting that UK investors in the program are even more tough on their 
demands. 
This data seem to support the defense of an undervaluation of the companies, 
especially if we take into account that the median of revenues of the companies is 
300,000 GBP, which would essentially mean that the firms are being evaluated at a 
multiple of one time its revenues by the investors from the show. 
Finally, we can look at the mortality rate among the featured companies. 
According to the available information, 17% (16 out of 94) of the companies receiving 
offers have dissolved by the time this study, a percentage that remains consistent with 
each different group: 2 out of 13 rejected deals, 8 out of 46 deals that fell through and 6 
out of 35 deals that followed through were dissolved. A report by  the European 
Commission (2003) sets the mortality rate for start-ups as over 50% after 5 years of 
inception, and while the timeframe is not the same, since we are bundling companies 
with different years of operations, some with more than 5 years and some with less, one 
could still assume that, according to the available data, the mortality rate among the 
featured companies is lower, whether they strike a deal or not. However, this could be 
biased by the fact that the show producers perform a pre-analysis and almost only 
companies with high growth actually feature the show, so therefore would perhaps be 
more probable to succeed.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The objectives of this study were to, by analyzing the growth of firms featuring 
reality shows in television featuring business angels, find any possible trends or 
deviances in their growth based on the outcome of their participation. By doing this 
analysis, our hope was to answer the main question supporting this study: Is striking a 
deal on the show really the best outcome for the future growth of the firm? 
The first conclusion that we can get from this study is that, even if a company is 
featuring on this kind of show, success is not granted from any perspective. From the 
analysis made, it was not found any statistical evidence that supported the common 
belief that just an appearance on the show can bring benefits and increase the growth of 
a firm just due to the publicity. 
However, it's undisputed that featuring in this kind of show may provide an 
initial hype on the company, while its long term growth key points lie elsewhere. 
This study did also not found any evidence that achieving a deal with the 
investors on the show will lead to greater growth performance of the company. 
Contrarily, the results actually point quite the opposite. As our result  showed, 
the companies who passed on the Dragon's deals tend to show a larger growth than the 
companies with confirmed deals. This may suggest not only that these entrepreneurs 
might have got the capital they were looking for from other possible investors, which 
seems rather likely since they got publicity with both customers and other investors by 
featuring in the show, but also, this being the case, it allows for speculation on whether 
by doing so they are likely to find more suitable and/or committed investors, resulting 
in a higher growth. This can be explored by further studies focusing on what actually 
happened with the companies who passed on the deals.  
All in all, an appearance in a show such as Dragon's Den, as well as making a 
deal within the show, is not, in a general way, necessary linked with superior growth. 
Obviously, there is much more that needs to be studied in this field. Jobs created 
by these companies could be strong possibility for another further study. Sohl (2008) 
estimated that business angels helped create 200,000 new jobs in the USA in 2007 
alone. It is then widely accepted that these individuals, in general, help the economy 
grow by working with high-growth SME's to achieve their full potential. Is this also the 
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case regarding the companies in a show such as this? Does it have a significant impact 
on the country's economy? 
It is also worth noting that, with regards of Portugal, the first season of the show 
has just finished, and according to a report written by Barbosa
1
, the percentage of deals 
made was much higher than in the analyzed series here in this study. They reviewed 85 
firms, and made deals with 60 of them. This represents a success rate of 70%, much 
higher than in the UK where it sat at 45% (83 companies out of 184). The same report 
features a comment made by one of the investors, claiming that they expect that 80% of 
the agreed deals actually follow through to being actual investments. If this ends up 
being true, again we see a much higher percentage than the one in this sample, which 
stood at 42% (29 out of 70 companies), and is in accordance to other reports from the 
UK . 
This could represent a very different  set of data for a possible Portuguese 
version of this analysis. Where the Portuguese investors much more relaxed with their 
investments? Another open door for a further study, but it seems as if they weren't as 
selective and demanding as the British investors in this sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Tubarões do Shark Tank investiram mais de três milhões de euros em cerca de 60 negócios 
http://www.dinheirovivo.pt/Buzz/interior.aspx?content_id=4462730 
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6. Limitations and critics 
 
 
The main problems of the sample are related to the lack of available information 
among entrepreneurial firms (Brav, 2009). This fact made the already not large sample 
of firms reduced even further as more than half of the featured companies did not have 
the necessary information for an analysis, and left no choice but to focus the analysis on 
the total assets growth rate,  due to the absence of Profit and Loss accounts. Here, the 
analysis of revenues or profits would allow for a more accurate view on the actual 
extent of the impact of featuring in television on sales numbers. 
There is also the geographical limitation of the sample, as this is based on the 
UK version of the show. This can be a bias on the sample towards the specific 
conditions of the country's economy, and also due to the personality traits of the BA's of 
the country, more passive according to Lindstrom and Olofsson (2001). The behavior of 
BA's of another country might be different, and lead to different conclusions, as we are 
already seeing significant differences in just the first season of the Portuguese version. 
It is also worth to mention that this analysis, while focusing on the available 
information, leaves out all other possible external factors, as well as some other factors 
inherent to each firm that can affect their performance. Whether it is the fact that they 
actually got an investment deal somewhere else, specific business decisions or other 
conditions that arose, these are all factors that are not taken into account and may distort 
the analysis. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Annex 1 – Similar studies table 
 
 
Authors Country Period 
of study 
Sample 
size 
Industrial 
Sector 
Data 
Collection 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Statistical 
Analysis 
(Revest 
and 
Sapio, 
2013) 
UK 1997-
2009 
139,598 All Amadeus, 
Osirirs 
databases 
Employees, 
Revenue, 
Total 
Assets 
Correlation, 
Regression 
(Alarape, 
2007) 
Nigeria Not 
specified 
62 All Interviews, 
Financial 
Reports 
Total 
Assets 
Regression 
(Glancey, 
1998) 
Scotland 1988-
1990 
38 Manufacturing Company 
House 
Total 
Assets 
Correlation, 
Regression 
(Töyli, 
Häkkinen, 
Ojala, and 
Naula, 
2008) 
Finland 2002-
2004 
424 All Surveys, 
Amadeus 
Revenue, 
Total 
Assets 
Correlation 
(Solomon, 
1997) 
United 
States 
1992-
1993 
26 All Consulting 
firms; 
Available 
inf.
1
 
Stock 
Prices 
Correlation 
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Annex 2 - Database of Firms receiving offers 
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Annex 3 - Database of Firms without offers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company name Airdate Description
Investment 
Asked
Equity 
Offered
Air Oasis 21/07/2008 purifier of water 125 10%
Layline 21/07/2008 sheets with a line dividing in the middle 50 20%
Saboteur Crime Prevention 28/07/2008 crime prevention housetools 275 10%
Carbon 6/ Screen Machine 28/07/2008 device for parents control kids TV time 150 15%
Shoes Galore Ltd 04/08/2008 shoe selling franchise 100 30%
Very PC 04/08/2008 energy efficient computers 250 5%
Fresh Olive Oil Club 11/08/2008 Club that distributes prime olive oil 50 10%
FB1- Frank Bisson 1 18/08/2008 blade for cutting hair 100 5%
Ifoods.tv 18/08/2008 social network about food 100 10%
Ladderbox Uk 25/08/2008 Tool tray that multi-fits to the top of all ladder types100 15%
Juliette's Interiors 25/08/2008 site selling french furniture and mirror 106 20%
Discrete Heat 01/09/2008 central heating 150 10%
TinyDeol.com Ltd 01/09/2008  fat and cholesterol free curry sauces 42 15%
prestige pet's products uk 08/09/2008 bowl for dogs 120 15%
Apocalypse Ltd 15/07/2009 hardcore horror live entertainments 200 20%
The Wholeleaf Co 22/07/2009 natural disposable dinnerware 120 20%
Dusty: A Life in Music 29/07/2009 musical 250 25%
Oarsome Potential 29/07/2009 protective grip for sports 75 20%
Spey Bay Mussel Farm 05/08/2009 mussel farm 100 20%
Clever Bins 05/08/2009 trash bins 65 10%
Wine Innovations Ltd 12/08/2009 pre filled wine glasses 250 25%
Saboteur Crime Prevention 19/08/2009 electric blind closer 120 20%
Grillstream 19/08/2009 easy to clean grill tray 120 15%
Bound Biographies 26/08/2009 biography productions 75 20%
Bee Automobiles 26/08/2009 electric cars 2500 30%
Extreme Fliers 02/09/2009 remote control mini helicopter/car 75 15%
Butterfly Technology 02/09/2009 product to squeeze all from a tube 75 15%
Flow Signals 14/07/2010 21 century traffic signals 50 10%
Flex FX Productions 14/07/2010 A Bollywood dance company which provides a wide range of entertainment from arena shows to corporate events200 30%
subeo 21/07/2010 personal submarine 1450 45%
EDH Washing Line 21/07/2010 80 25%
Tatty Bumpkin 26/07/2010 A children's lifestyle brand that includes clothing, yoga, toys and books.200 20%
Aquatina 26/07/2010 A collapsible, concertina shaped refillable water bottle that aims to reduce bottled water waste100 10%
Rotaball 02/08/2010 An outdoor leisure activity based on football in a similar genre to swingball.150 10%
Blooming High 02/08/2010 A stackable outdoor plant container 50 15%
Black Nut Iberian Pig Feed 09/08/2010 A manufactured pig feed that replaces the acorn, the Black Nut Iberian Pig's natural food source.100 20%
Zigo 09/08/2010 Combined bicycle and buggy. 225 6%
Angel Cot 16/08/2010 Suitcase combined infant cot and baby changing station150 40%
Advanced Building Designs 16/08/2010 Various products for the building and plumbing industries, the RadClamp, Radwrench, pump nut removal tool and tap splitter89 15%
Gift Card Converter 24/08/2010 Website to buy/exchange gift cards 50 25%
Citidogs 24/08/2010 dogs creche 75 20%
yum yums 31/08/2010 Books for children to encourage healthy eating.100 20%
Odourbuster 31/08/2010 A product that can be fitted to toilets and draws the smell out and down the flushpipe when people are using the bathroom.75 15%
Abiie Buggy (My Babiie ltd) 13/09/2010 Buggy that incorporates a changing table 100 10%
GaBoom 13/09/2010 Website to exchange computer games 65 11%
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Company name Airdate Description
Investment 
Asked
Equity 
Offered
Miruji Health 31/07/2011 chair to help people lose weight 100 10%
The British DJ and MC Academy 07/08/2011 name speaks 150 20%
UV body sculpture 07/08/2011 50 20%
Rascal Dog Litter Box 14/08/2011 a fresh take on dog litter trays 75 20%
My Sea Safe 21/08/2011 detachable safe for sun loungers 150 5%
Rico Mexican Kitchen 21/08/2011 mexican food 75 20%
Myburgh Designs 28/08/2011 design company 70 20%
Aqua Sheko Fish Spa 04/09/2011 fish spa experience with modern Japanese bars150 30%
Brat & Suzie 04/09/2011 hand drawn, illustrated animal t-shirts and jumpers65 20%
Opus Innovations 12/09/2011 baby accessories 50 10%
Health Swing 12/09/2011 indoor, progressive, whole-body mobiliser and rehabilitation swing50 40%
Wingz 19/09/2011 Sleeves for women 50 30%
Realtor Network Ltd 19/09/2011 real estate agency 50 20%
Savvy Lash 26/09/2011 cosmetic tool to safely separate eyelashes 50 20%
The Nuttery 26/09/2011 bird feeders 100 15%
Romeo Products/ Romeo Shell 26/09/2011 an outdoor shelving system for drinks 50 25%
Culicka Ltd 03/10/2011 game toy in a cube 80 10%
Redfoot 03/10/2011 folding shoes 300 10%
Sendmybag 09/09/2012 service to ship bags 100 5%
Abspak 09/09/2012 device for abs while seating 50 25%
Third Door Workhub and Nursery 16/09/2012 day care nursery for babies and offices for parents120 20%
Dirty Beach 16/09/2012 Beach bar 100 10%
13 horror ltd 09/09/2012 horror experience books 50 20%
Mamka 09/09/2012 e-commerce website 200 10%
Lost For Words 30/09/2012 Game show 80 25%
Hunting Foot 30/09/2012 products for older people 80 30%
The Wheelbarrow Booster 30/09/2012 bag to double volume of barrow 50 10%
Camping Bugs 07/10/2012 Glamping 250 30%
Sticker Make-up 07/10/2012 eyeliner 50 20%
topline dance frame 14/10/2012 dance frame 97,5 15%
Queue For You 21/10/2012 app to not wait in line in callcenters 150 1%
Fellas 21/10/2012 intimate cleaning wipes for men 60 20%
Drumchasers 28/10/2012 percussion-based musical 60 20%
Nebo 11/11/2012 raised toilet for back pain 85 15%
Purepotions Skincare 11/11/2012 ointments and cream for dry skin 90 15%
Caterquip 18/11/2012 refurbished catering equipment supplier 100 10%
Dayfame Luxury VIP experiences 18/11/2012 celebrity treatment for a night out on the tiles100 30%
Synagi Intelligence 18/11/2012 hand tool with interchangeable heads for housejobs95 20%
It-soles 25/11/2012 soles for dancing for women in high heels 50 15%
Carkoon 02/12/2012 baby seat with air bag 100 20%
Boatbox Ltd 02/12/2012 box for top of car that turns into boat 100 16%
Melbry Events 27/12/2012 Christmas experience event 100 20%
Pucket 27/12/2012 wooden game 50 10%
